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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 




KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Angel Ferrer appeals from the District Court’s order denying his motion for a 
sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
I. Discussion1 
The Fair Sentencing Act raised the drug-quantity thresholds needed to trigger 
certain mandatory-minimum sentences.  Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 
(2010).  With the First Step Act, Congress gave district courts discretion to implement 
those changes retroactively.  Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).  But 
while a court’s discretion to grant sentence reductions is broad, it is not unbounded.  At 
least two limits apply.  First, a district court must “make an accurate calculation of the 
amended guidelines range.”  United States v. Murphy, 998 F.3d 549, 560 (3d Cir. 2021) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Second, a court must “consider the [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 3553(a) factors.”  United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2020).   
Ferrer argues that the District Court erred on both fronts.  He first faults the Court 
for failing to recite the amended statutory and guidelines ranges.  But even if this omission 
constitutes error, the error is harmless.  Because the revised statutory range is what made 
Ferrer eligible for a sentence reduction, we have little doubt that the District Court 
accounted for that range.  And because Ferrer’s new guidelines range duplicates his old 
 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and 
§ 404(b) of the First Step Act, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742.  We review a district court’s denial of a First Step Action motion for abuse 




one, there is no “reasonable probability” that spelling out the range would have altered the 
Court’s analysis.  Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016); see also 
United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).   
Turning to the § 3553(a) factors, Ferrer questions the District Court’s determination 
that decreasing his sentence would create an unwarranted disparity between him and other 
defendants sentenced after the Fair Sentencing Act.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  Before 
the Act’s passage, Ferrer’s drug quantity—over three kilograms of crack-cocaine—
exceeded the statutory threshold of fifty grams and therefore triggered a mandatory-
minimum sentence of ten years.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).  
The Fair Sentencing Act increased that threshold to 280 grams.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).  So were Ferrer convicted today, his three kilos of crack-cocaine 
would implicate the same mandatory minimum.  Reducing his punishment would thus 
make him better off than a similarly-situated defendant sentenced after the Act.  We have 
previously urged courts to avoid such disparities, so we perceive no error in the District 
Court avoiding them here.  See United States v. Jackson, 964 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2020).   
Disparities aside, Ferrer criticizes the Court for placing too much weight on his 
prison disciplinary infractions and too little weight on the First Step Act’s remedial 
purposes.  Neither position has force.  Contrary to Ferrer’s suggestion, the Court did not 
treat his infractions as decisive, but rather as one of many factors counseling against relief.  
As for the Act’s remedial purposes, courts honor those purposes by carefully considering 
the § 3553(a) factors.  See Easter, 975 F.3d at 325; United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Ferrer’s 
motion for a sentence reduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
